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FEDERAL LIMITS ON STATE COAL
SEVERANCE TAXES
INTRODUCTION
The future of energy development in the United States depends
upon restraining federal power in order to afford the states an opportu-
nity to control their destinies. Western states imposed a tax on coal to
regulate mining and to cover state expenses incurred due to the mining
activity. A coal severance tax, levied as a fixed percentage of the mar-
ket value of coal when mined, creates a fund to aid affected areas both
during the mining process and after the mining companies' departure.
A state must protect its right to tax and conserve its natural resources
against unreasonable federal intervention.
Federal legislation, introduced in the 96th Congress, sought to place
a percentage ceiling on state coal severance taxes. The nation needed
such limits, proponents claimed, since the high taxes of certain western
states made energy more expensive and thereby inhibited increased de-
velopment of domestic energy resources. The proposed legislation
targeted Montana and Wyoming, the two western states having the
greatest coal reserves and the highest coal severance taxes. Although a
state may tax business activity within its boundaries to pay for state
services used during such activity, legislators alleged that the severance
taxes of Montana and Wyoming supplemented the state general fund,
thereby reducing the tax burden on their own citizens. It was hoped
that federal legislation would aid in realizing the national goal of en-
ergy independence while lessening the advantages enjoyed by the re-
source-rich western states.
This note focuses on the current struggle between the western
states and the federal government over who should control coal devel-
opment. Through imposition of federal limits, this note concludes,
Congress would unjustly infringe on traditional powers of the states,
sacrificing states' rights in an attempt to realize energy independence.
In order to preclude such action, this note proposes creation of a re-
gional coal commission to supervise western coal development, a body
which would safeguard state interests without disregarding national en-
ergy needs.
STATE INTERESTS
Increased prices of foreign oil, together with energy shortages in the
1970's, forced the United States to look for alternate, domestic sources
of energy to supply its needs. Policymakers focused on coal, the only
abundant fossil fuel resource in the country, to break an ever-increas-
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ing reliance on unstable foreign sources of energy.' The federal gov-
ernment continues to view greater use of coal as the key to energy
independence.2 Moreover, because of the more desirable qualities of
western, as opposed to eastern coal, western coal mining has been the
center of these federal energy interests in recent years.
Mining of western coal, low in sulphur and less expensive to mine
than eastern coal, greatly increased during the 1970's.3 Utilities in cit-
ies as far away as Detroit and San Antonio now use western coal.4
Faced with the sudden rush for their coal reserves, western states im-
posed coal severance taxes5 to control coal development and to provide
funding for state programs dealing with both the social and environ-
mental impacts of mining.6 Since full-scale coal mining was relatively
1. Coal is an abundant but underutilized energy resource in the United States. In 1976 coal
consumption constituted only 19% of total energy use. Americans used 6.8 million barrels of
the oil equivalent of coal, 10.0 million barrels of the oil equivalent of natural gas, and 17.4
million barrels of oil. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AN ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF INCREASED COAL UTILIZATION 2-12 (1979). Yet, the United States has reserves
estimated at 3.2 trillion tons-77% of the nation's total conventional energy reserves. U.S.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, FOSSIL ENERGY PROGRAM: SUMMARY DOCUMENT 33 (1980).
2. Renewed emphasis on use of coal as an energy resource began with President Nixon's Pro-
ject Independence and continued with President Carter's National Energy Plan. See gener-
ally National Energy Act." Hearings on HA 6831 Before the House Comm on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1977). Moreover, the budget proposed bythe
Reagan Administration calls for increases in leasing of energy resources on federal lands.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1981, § Y, at 11, col. 5.
3. Government regulations place stringent limitations on sulphur emissions of coal-fired gener-
ating plants. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-7413 (Supp. 11 1978). By burning western coal,
utilities need less pollution-control equipment in order to satisfy federal sulphur emission
requirements. Moreover, western coal deposits lie closer to the surface and in larger seams
than deposits of eastern coal. The cost of recovery to the coal producer is much less. See
Binder, Strip Mining." The West and the Nation, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 3 (1977).







Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, - Mont. - 615 P.2d 847, 849-50 (1980), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3428 (Dec. 8, 1980) (judicial notice of figures from Mont. Dep't of Revenue).
Wyoming produced seven million tons of coal in 1970. It now produces more than seventy
million tons per year. Coal Severance Tax." Hearings on S. 2695 Before the Senate Comm on
Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Ses. 154 (1980) (statement by Rep. Dick Cheney)
[hereinafter cited as Hearigns on S. 2695].
4. See note 33 infra, for partial listing of western coal customers.
5. A severance tax is a "levy assessed at flat or graduated rates by a government on the privi-
lege, process or act of commercially severing or extracting natural resources from the soil or
water, and measured by the physical amount or the gross or net value of the natural resource
produced or sold." Lockner, The Economic Effect of the Severance Tax on Decisions of the
Mining Firm, 4 NAT. RESOURCES J. 469 (1965). Currently, 16 states have a severance tax on
coal: ALA. CODE § 40-13-2 (1975); Am. STAT. ANN. § 84-2102 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 39-29-106 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 211.31 (West 1975); IDAHO CODE § 47-1201 (Supp.
1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 143.020 (Baldwin 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:633 (West
1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-26-6 (1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-61-01 (Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5749.02 (Page Supp. 1979);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 931 (West 1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 10-39-1 (1978);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5902 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 67-5902 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 11-13-
2a (1975); WYo. STAT. § 39-6-303 (Supp. 1977).
6. Wyoming enacted the coal severance tax in 1974, and Montana enacted its tax in 1975. Full-
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new to the West, state legislators were forced to predict the amount of
revenue required for the local aid and reclamation. Nevertheless, the
legislators resolved that their states would not again suffer through the
"boom and bust" cycles of the past.7
Through the coal severance tax, western states hope to sustain coal
mining over a longer period of time and to recoup part of the wealth
that mining companies ship away. Severance taxes encourage coal
conservation while allowing the state to get back the money spent on
solving social and environmental problems created by the mining activ-
ity. Inducing coal companies to mine at a slower rate enables a state to
conserve part of its coal reserves for future generations. The severance
tax increases the cost of production and tends to retard the mining pro-
cess; as a result, more coal deposits remain for future use. Imposition
of the tax makes it less economical for coal producers to strip mine an
area quickly or to dig to the lowest level of deposits.8 In addition to
extending the mining process over a longer period of time, the tax also
works to minimize the adverse environmental effects of mining.9
As long as demand for western coal remains high, coal producers
will continue to mine. In spite of relatively high severance taxes in
Wyoming and Montana, production has increased dramatically.' 0 It
appears, therefore, that although the severance tax decreases mining
activity, coal producers continue to meet demands for western coal.
More importantly, the tax creates funds for use in alleviating social
problems caused by coal mining and in providing for long-term recla-
mation of the land.
In the West, coal deposits generally lie in sparsely populated areas.
Although bankers and merchants welcome the economic surge that ac-
companies development of a mine site, small towns usually lack reve-
nue to provide public services for the sudden influx of people. Costs of
government services are enormous, and expenditures must be made
before taxes from newly developed property are collected."
When mining activity begins, local communities must undertake
extensive renovation and construction of public works in order to pro-
scale coal mining is new to these states; therefore, a period of adjustment to the development
still remains. Much of the revenue has been directed at the mining areas; however, it is still
too early to determine the success of the state programs. See WYo. STAT. §§ 39-6-302 & -303
(1977), MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979).
7. See note 19 infra.
8. Lochner, The Economic Effect of the Severance Tax on Decisions of the Mining Firm, 4 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 470 (1965). The severance tax adds to the cost of recovering the coal. Varia-
ble costs, such as labor and material, rise as the rate and level of recovery increases, thereby
cutting into the profit margin of the coal producer. The addition of the tax to the cost struc-
ture of the mining firm, in effect, reduces that rate and level of recovery where the firm's
profits are maximized (that is, where average cost is at a minimum).
9. In addition, when the mining process proceeds more slowly, the surrounding community can
better adjust to the development. See discussion notes 11-14 infra. Since the coal miners do
not dig as deeply, less damage to the underground water table results.
10. See note 3 supra.
I1. Hearings on S 2695, supra note 3, at 318-39 (statement of Thomas Towe).
[Vol. 8:322
Federal Limits
vide housing and basic services for mine workers. Towns must expand
schools, police and fire protection, water and sewer systems, and road
networks.' 2 Initially, the original residents of a community must bear
the cost of expansion since the expenditures are made in anticipation of
subsequent tax revenue from mining development.' 3 In addition, pub-
lic services are often funded by local bond issues, which may require a
continuous source of revenue during the period of repayment. Should
the coal company and miners move out, therefore, a town may be de-
prived of its major source of tax revenue prior to payment of the mu-
nicipal debt. 4
The mineral-rich states of the West now recognize the value of con-
serving their natural resources. The "boom and bust" cycles of the past
left scars on both the land and the people as mining companies ex-
ported mineral wealth out of the region. State policymakers now rec-
ognize that prosperity brought by mining does not endure.' 5 Thus, the
severance tax allows for coal mining yet insures that the entire cost of
development and reclamation does not fall on the citizens of the state.
Western coal reserves lie under semiarid lands used primarily for
grazing. Developed over thousands of years, this fragile ecosystem sus-
tains hardy native grasses that both provide high-protein diets for cattle
and prevent erosion.'6 Strip mining destroys the topsoil and makes re-
generation of native grasses extremely difficult. Exotic grasses, intro-
duced by utilities and coal companies in order to satisfy state
reclamation laws, thrive only during periods of plentiful rainfall. Test
plots do well with massive irrigation and fertilization but, without such
intensive cultivation, cannot withstand the droughts periodically exper-
ienced in the region. 7 Revenue generated from coal severance taxes
must be used, in part, for reclamation efforts and long-term research
projects aimed at restoring the native rangelands.
The economies of western coal-producing states depend, in the long
run, upon agriculture not strip mining. 8 Ranchers, however, cannot
afford the cultivation of exotic grasses. Instead, they must rely on self-
sustaining range grasses in order to stay in business. Yet, restoration of
range grasses takes far longer than the duration of mining activity in
12. See Binder, Strip Mining, 7Te West and the Nation, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 11-16 (1977).
13. Little, Some Social Consequences of Boom Towns, N.D.L. REV. 405-06 (1977).
14. Id. at 407.
15. "A history of boom and bust cycles has taught Montana people to view their state not only as
an inheritance from their parents but also as a loan from their children-a loan which must
be repaid." Hearings on S, 2695, supra note 3, at 299 (statement by Ted Schwinden).
16. K. Ross TOOLE, THE RAPE OF THE GREAT PLAINS 122-23 (1976).
17. In 1974, a National Academy of Sciences-National Academy of Engineering study con-
cluded that the rate and success of rehabilitating coal lands in the West depends on rainfall.
In the more ard regions, revegetation of an area may, if attainable at all, take decades.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226
(1975).
18. Toole, a noted Montana historian, points out that although Montana may prosper from the
mining activity, such an influx of wealth is short-lived. The coal deposits may be gone in 30
years, but agriculture provides the state with a self-renewing industry, as long as the grazing
lands are not permanently destroyed by mining. TOOLE, supra note 16, at 143.
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the region, and reclamation laws generally require neither continued
involvement by mining companies nor guaranteed restoration of natu-
ral range conditions. The coal severance tax, therefore, must provide
funds for this long-term reclamation effort.
Prior to enacting coal severance taxes, states considered both direct
costs and the long-term impact of mining.' 9 Although the value of
state services necessary to sustain mining activity in the short run may
be easily calculated, the cost of complete reclamation remains un-
known for many years. Once the producer leaves, however, the state
alone must bear the cost of reclamation or accept the loss of productive
grazing land forever. 20  By paying the severance tax, coal companies
contribute to reclamation, even though their own efforts in revegetating
the range lands may be ineffective. The tax creates funds for state rec-
lamation efforts even after the mining ceases.
Although surface mining of coal is relatively new to the West, the
history of Appalachian coal mining demonstrated that companies
rarely complied with reclamation laws and that reclamation laws alone
were inadequate to bring about restoration of the land.2' Ohio's recla-
mation law, typical in the region, requires the operator to replant the
surface-mined area twice.22 If the two plantings fail, the land remains
barren; yet, the producer's legal obligation is fulfilled, and the state
lacks the funds to undertake reclamation on its own.
States must remain free to impose taxes both to cover adequately
social and environmental costs of mining and to control the rate of de-
velopment in order to save coal for the future. Although a state's
power to safeguard resources for use by its citizens is limited, conserva-
tion remains a viable interest of a state.23 In Douglas v. Seacoast Prod-
ucts, the Supreme Court struck down a licensing statute which, in
effect, barred non-residents from fishing off the coastal waters of Vir-
ginia.24 The Court ruled that the particular state regulation went too
far in discriminating against out-of-state residents and in favoring its
own citizens. Nevertheless, the decision reaffirmed the power of states
to impose "reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and environ-
19. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 847 (1980), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3428 (Dec. 8, 1980). "For these and other reasons, in 1975, the legislature moved
to fix a tax that would provide for both the present and the future when the coal deposits
were gone." Id. at 850.
20. The federal government contributes to the cost of reclamation, but the funds usually prove to
be inadequate. Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, the mine
operator must pay for each ton of coal thirty-five cents into a trust fund for future reclama-
tion. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1231-1232 (West Sup. 1979).
21. See Reitze, Old King Coalandthe Merry Rapists ofAppalachia, 22 CASE W. RaS. L. REV. 691
(1971).
22. OH1o CODE § 1513.16(f) (Page Supp. 1970).
23. In Northern Gas Co. v. Kansas Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963), the Court stated: "There is no
doubt that the states do possess power to allocate and conserve scarce natural resources upon
and beneath their lands." Id. at 93. But see Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,
600 (1923) (West Virginia statute, requiring fulfillment of local natural gas needs before ex-
portation); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
24. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
[Vol. 8:322
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mental protection measures otherwise within their police power. 25
Coal severance taxes aim at alleviating problems created by mining
activity. State policymakers know how past generations suffered dur-
ing the gold and silver boom and realize that the well-being of the citi-
zenry is again endangered by coal development. If viewed as a
reasonable means to attain legitimate state objectives, state taxation of
mining will be upheld as a valid way to provide for the health, safety,
and welfare of the state's citizens.26 States need the revenue to care for
their people and land; any federal ceiling on state coal severance taxes
would hamper the states in insuring the health and welfare of their
citizens.
FEDERAL INTERESTS
In the 96th Congress, legislation was introduced that threatened a
state's power to control development of its resources and to raise reve-
nue covering costs of that development. Senate Bill S. 2675, an amend-
ment to the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978,27
proposed a twelve and one-half percent limit for state severance taxes
on coal mined on federal and Indian lands.2" The House counterpart,
H.R. Res. 6625, expanded the scope of this proposal by imposing the
twelve and one-half percent ceiling on all coal mined within a state.2 9
Although the bills have not yet been introduced in the 97th Congress,
members of Congress continue to emphasize increased domestic pro-
duction of coal.30 This emphasis insures future conffict with any state
regulation viewed as impeding increased development of coal reserves.
The federal legislation would have reduced the coal severance taxes
currently levied by Wyoming and Montana. These states tax coal at
seventeen and thirty percent respectively; 3t no other state taxes coal at
25. 431 U.S. at 277.
26. See Barwise v. Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33, 40 (1936); Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172
(1923). In Lord, the Court stated that the levy of a tax upon the mining of iron ore was not a
forbidden interference with interstate commerceper se, even if the ore is loaded immediately
upon railroad cars to be shipped out of state. Id. at 179. In suits alleging that a particular
state tax burdens interstate commerce, the state must show that the revenue collected bears a
reasonable relationship to the cost of state services provided. See Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977). Also, a state may not discriminate against out-of-
state consumers. Ariz. Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979). For example, in
Snead, the Supreme Court struck down a tax on electricity because it placed a greater tax
burden on out-of-state consumers than on in-state consumers. Id. at 150.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 8301 (Supp. 11 1978).
28. Hearings on S. 2695, supra note 3, at 3. Senator Dale Bumpers, a Democrat from Arkansas,
sponsored the bill. Id.
29. H.R. 6625, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (unpublished). Sponsored by Representative Philip
Sharp, a Democrat from Indiana, the bill was passed without amendment by the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee by a vote of fifteen to nine.
30. H.R. REs. 10, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (unpublished). Sponsored by Representative
Douglas Applegate, the resolution calls for renewal of a national energy plan emphasizing
the use of domestic coal to displace foreign energy imports.
31. Wyoming places various excise taxes on mining activity, as well as an additional two percent
severance tax on coal. The total state tax on coal, therefore, is ten and one-half percent. See
WYO. STAT. §§ 39-6-302 & -303 (1977). County governments in Wyoming add a six and
one-half percent ad valorem tax, bringing the total tax on coal to seventeen percent. Hearings
1981]
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 8:322
a rate greater than the twelve and one-half percent maximum set by the
proposed legislation.32
Proponents of the bills argue that high state severance taxes add to
energy costs in coal-importing states because the utilities pass the re-
sulting coal costs on to consumers. Thus, the tax burdens consumers in
states dependent on imported coal.33 At the same time, proponents ar-
gue, the tax creates surplus revenue for coal-producing states.34 Since a
portion of the proceeds from the tax goes into the states' general funds,
state governments may be able to reduce personal income taxes and
property taxes paid by their residents.35 Finally, the sponsors argue
that the severance tax, by making energy produced from coal more ex-
pensive, interferes with the national goal of achieving energy indepen-
dence through increased coal production and use.3 6
It is clear that Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate interstate
commerce, could enact legislation limiting state severance taxes. The
commerce clause permits Congress to regulate interstate commerce and
to override state statutes that impair the flow of goods among the
states.37 Congress may also prevent state regulation in a particular area
or allow concurrent regulation subject to federal guidelines. Any fed-
eral act striking down a state regulation, however, must be scrutinized
as to whether such federal intervention impermissibly restricts the
state's police power under the Tenth Amendment.38
on S. 2695, supra note 3, at 142 (prepared statement of Senator Malcolm Wallop). Montana
imposes a flat thirty percent tax on strip mined coal having a heating value over 7000 British
Thermal Units per pound. See MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979).
32. See note 5 supra.
33. Virtually all of Montana's coal has been committed to long-term production contracts for use
outside of Montana. Note, The Increasing Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation
and Federal Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L. REV. 675, 677 (1979). Yet, the effect of the tax on the
ultimate price of energy is negligible when compared with other costs. See table on next
page.
34. The Congressional Budget Office has predicted surpluses from 1980 coal severance taxes of
$5.1 million and $15.7 million for Montana and Wyoming respectively. By 1990, surpluses
will grow to $84 million and $328 million respectively. Hearings on S. 2695, supra note 3, at
7-8 (statement by Sen. Bentsen).
35. See note 40 infra. Montana and Wyoming have yet to provide any tax relief as a result the
severance tax surpluses. The increased revenue for the general fund, however, will surely
allow for more government services without raising personal taxes.
36. For example, San Antonio, a city that imports coal from the Decker mine in Montana, is
considering buying cheaper, foreign coal for its energy needs. 126 CONG. REC. H 10,961
(daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980) (prepared statement by Reps. James Oberstar and Philip Sharp).
Thus, western coal severence taxes have a direct effect on the national price of coal. Coal
fields in the Northern Great Plains and the Rocky Mountain Province contain 90 percent of
the United States low-sulphur reserves that may be strip mined. Forty-two percent of this
desirable coal is found in Wyoming alone. See Binder, supra note 3, at 3.
37. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate commerce. . . among the several states
.U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Montana's Supreme Court upheld the state's coal severance tax in Commonwealth
Edison v. State, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 847 (1980), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3428 (Dec. 8,
1980). The court ruled that the tax did not interfere with interstate commerce since the
severance of coal preceded the entry of the product into interstate commerce.
38. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to

















The coal severance tax may be held violative of the commerce
clause if the federal interest in promoting the flow of domestic energy
among the states outweighs the state interest in raising revenue for the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. In making this determination,
the courts apply a three-part test to determine the validity of a state tax
under the commerce clause: 1) the tax must be reasonably related to
the services provided by the state; 2) it must not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and 3) there must be a definite link between the
taxing state and the property or activity taxed.39 The prime objection
to the coal severance taxes of Wyoming and Montana is rooted in the
suspicion that the tax revenue not only compensates states for debts
incurred as a result of mining, but also adds to the general revenue
fund of the states.' As previously noted, however, states cannot accu-
rately predict the amount of revenue needed to solve current problems
and to provide for future generations.
Proponents of the federal legislation argue that "excessive" state
severance taxes increase the cost of energy to consumers who depend
upon western coal and thereby inhibit the flow of goods among the
states.4 Relying upon the commerce -clause as a constitutional basis
for this federal legislation, Congress need only have a rational basis for
enacting the regulatory scheme to protect interstate commerce. 42 It is
arguable, therefore, that since the severance tax increases the price of
coal, it necessarily imposes a barrier to the free flow of goods among
the states. Should Congress reintroduce and enact limits on state sever-
ance taxes, the legislation may be upheld under the commerce clause,
assuming such federal action does not impermissibly deprive the states
of traditional sovereign power.
The limitation on federal power was affirmed in National League of
Cities v. Usery.4 3 The Supreme Court held that the commerce power
could not be used to regulate an integral government function of a
39. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
40. Montana severance tax revenue is allocated as follows:
1) 50% for a trust fund created by Article IX, section 5, of the Montana Constitu-
tion;
2) 37.5% to the Impact Area and Education Trust Fund;
3) 13% to coal area highway improvement;
4) 10% to school aid;
5) 5% for parks, cultural and aesthetic projects;
6) 5% for alternate energy research and development;
7) 2.5% for renewable resources;
8) 2% for arts and state library site acquisition;
9) 1% for land use planning; and
10) 24% for the General Fund.
Motr. REV. CODES ANN. 15-35-109 (1979). See also Wyo. STAT. § 39-6-305 (1977).
41. See 126 CONG. REC. H 10,961 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980) (prepared statement by Reps. James
Oberstar and Philip Sharp). Contra note 33 supra.
42. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
43. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Supreme Court struck down federal legislation which imposed




state. In National League of Cities, however, the Court failed to list
those state functions that are immune from federal regulation. As a
result, in each case the Court must balance the state and federal inter-
ests involved." While the proposed federal legislation does not pro-
hibit state taxation of coal, the proposed limitation may
unconstitutionally interfere with a state's authority in the exercise of
legitimate state regulation.
Recently, a case challenging the Montana severance tax was argued
before the Supreme Court." The appellants, a utility company and
several coal producers, argued that the tax unduly burdened interstate
commerce in violation of the commerce clause. Montana, on the other
hand, argued that the tax provided revenue necessary for state services
and that a state's right to tax must be upheld. In making its decision,
the Court must analyze the effect of the tax on interstate commerce and
strike the balance between state interest and the national need for west-
ern coal.
Limitation of coal severance taxes, either by the courts or Congress,
cannot be tolerated. Both lack knowledge of strip mining in the West
and cannot adequately insure the continued welfare of the people in
the coal-producing states.
Severance taxes provide states with revenue for purposes directly
related to mining and its social, economic, and ecological impact.
Since costs of coal mining vary throughout the country, an arbitrary
federal ceiling permits no flexibility for regional differences. State leg-
islators are better able to determine both the cost of coal development
and the long-term environmental impact of strip mining in their
states.46
Although Congress has the authority to preempt a state law which
interferes with the national interest, federal regulations which deprive
states of the police powers reserved under the Tenth Amendment are
impermissible. The legislation proposed last session reflects the impor-
tant national objectives of obtaining inexpensive energy from domestic
sources. The federal action, however, would cut too far into state sov-
ereignty in an area where the states are better able to govern. The
courts and Congress, therefore, must vest future control of coal devel-
opment in the coal-producing states.
44. Ripple & Kenyon, State Sovereignty. A Polished But Slippery Crown, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW.
745 (1979).
45. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, - Mont. -, 615 P.2d 847 (1980);prob.jurs. noted, 101
S. Ct. 607 (1980) (argued on March 30, 1981). On July 2, 1981, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Montana court and upheld the tax by a 6-3 vote. The Court held the tax did not violate
either the Commerce Clause, under the test in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274 (1977), or the Supremacy Clause. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S.
Ct. 2948 (1981).
46. Hearings on S. 2695, supra note 3, at 128 (prepared statement by Sen. Melcher).
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PROPOSED SOLUTION: REGIONAL COAL COMMISSION
Rather than impose unreasonable restrictions on state coal sever-
ance taxes, Congress should call for the formation of a regional coal
commission. Composed of representatives from western coal-export-
ing states, the commission would work to identify and protect state
interests while operating within reasonable federal guidelines.47 Fed-
eral involvement in commission activities would be limited to a super-
visory role.
The commission would begin by promulgating guidelines for taxa-
tion, production limitations, and other coal mining activities affecting
the national economy. Under the proposal, states would remain free to
regulate the coal industry within their borders. Should state legislation
exceed the commission's guidelines, however, the state would either
justify its non-compliance or revise its statute to meet commission stan-
dards.
Initially, the commission would face difficulties in forming a con-
sensus among its members. Although the states share a concern about
future coal development, interests and approaches to regulating the
mining industry vary. By making state regulations in the region as uni-
form as possible, however, the commission could prevent any one state
from gaining an unfair advantage to the detriment of the other member
states.
Beyond satisfying state interests, the commission would be required
to demonstrate to Congress that western states will not ignore the inter-
ests of energy consumers in the rest of the nation. Efforts to frame and
enforce reasonable guidelines for the region would confirm the region's
willingness to ease the nation's energy problems. Annual reports to
Congress on production and tax revenue would review the commis-
sion's progress.
Upon satisfaction of the federal objectives, the commission would
focus on solving the regional problems caused by coal development.
By pooling the knowledge and experience of its members, the commis-
sion could develop long-range plans to alleviate the problems of west-
ern mining towns and the problem of reclamation of rangelands.
Individual states may lack the expertise to solve these problems alone.
47. In 1975, the governors of ten western states took initial steps to deal with common problems
of energy development in the region. The Western Governors' Regional Energy Policy Of-
fice was formed to carry out the objectives set by participants at the conference. See White &
Berg, Energy Development in the West: Conflict and Coordination of Governmental Decision-
Making, 52 N.D.L. REV. 508-12 (1976).
The Water Resources Planning Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976), allows for creation of river
basin commissions, upon application to the Water Resource Council, by a state located in a
particular river basin. This request must be approved both by the Council and a majority of
states in the particular river basin. A commission is empowered to coordinate plans for
development of water and related resources, undertake studies of water and related land




Although the right to control the use of resources remains impor-
tant, a state cannot overtax or withhold its coal from a nation depen-
dent on fossil fuels. Nevertheless, in sharing its mineral wealth, a state
need not become a "slagheap" for the good of the country. States must
guard their sovereign rights against unreasonable federal intervention.
By adopting the commission proposal, western states will sacrifice some
authority yet will retain their basic sovereign powers. The regional
commission would accomplish national energy objectives without de-
nying the states control over future coal development; it would also
avoid the otherwise inevitable federal preemption of state energy re-
source regulation. The ability of states to govern within their borders is
the foundation of our federal system. While the national economy de-
pends upon future energy development, state rights cannot be under-
mined in order to achieve energf independence.
Joseph P. Gilligan*
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